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Abstract 
Prior studies on capital investments, including mergers and acquisitions, point to investment 
irreversibility as the primary factor behind diminished investments during periods of increased policy 
uncertainty. We show that increased relational risk, due to the potential for counterparty misbehavior 
or shirking and higher contracting costs, appears to be the primary driver behind the diminished 
propensity to undertake strategic alliances during enhanced policy uncertainty regimes. Alliances are 
even less likely during such times when they (a) involve more than two firms, (b) are in industries with 
greater counterparty risk, and (c) involve partners that require intense contracts.  
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1. Introduction 
Strategic alliances1 have gained increasing prominence in the corporate landscape and now 
occupy a central place in corporate decision-making.  Nevin (2014) notes that “strategic alliances are 
sweeping through nearly every industry and are becoming an essential driver of superior growth. The 
value of alliance is estimated to reach $30 trillion to $50 trillion in the next five years (p. 212).” A 
recent comprehensive white paper by KPMG's global strategy group emphasizes the growing 
importance of strategic alliances by stating "M&A has long been considered one of the most important things a 
CEO, and her/his company, will ever be involved in. But the pace and diversity of disruption is turning the spotlight 
onto alliances as critical, strategic tools to address a wide range of competitive threats."2  
The focus of this study is to examine the link between policy uncertainty, which is the 
economic risk generated due to the uncertainty of government decisions, and strategic alliances.  New 
measures of policy uncertainty have generated a number of studies that examine the effect of policy 
uncertainty on various corporate decisions relating to M&A (Nguyen and Phan 2017; Bonaime et al. 
2018), capital investment (Gulen and Ion 2016), venture capital (Tian and Ye 2017), and initial public 
offerings (IPOs) (Çolak et al. 2017). However, despite the economic importance of strategic alliances 
as value-drivers for firms, the literature is silent on how policy uncertainty affects strategic alliance 
deals between firms. 
                                                          
1 Strategic alliances are arrangements between two or more business entities to cooperate on products, technologies or 
services (Gulati 1995). These vehicles are used to enter new markets (Robinson 2008), share mutually beneficial knowledge 
(Gomes-Casseres et al. 2006), enhance their internal competencies (Lin and Darnall 2015), and pool financial resources 
(Ozmel et al. 2013).  
 
2 Strategic alliances: a real alternative to M&A? (KPMG, Jan 2018) 
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/ie/pdf/2018/01/ie-strategic-alliances-a-real-alternative-to-ma.pdf 
Based on a survey of 1,300 CEOs, over 92 percent of the CEOs consider strategic alliances as "extremely important" or 
"important" in their corporate strategy.  
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Strategic alliances involve less investment, and rely heavily on co-operation from another party 
providing a setting to investigate policy uncertainty’s possible effect on cooperation incentives. In this 
study, we extend the analytical framework by contending that there is an alternative to the investment 
irreversibility argument in the form of 'relational risk'– “the probability and consequences of not 
having sufficient cooperation (Das and Teng 2001, 253),” which increases when policy is uncertain. 
This view has been previously ignored in this literature. Put differently, this study allows us to consider 
another significant factor at play, besides investment irreversibility, introducing tension in determining 
the net effect on strategic alliances under policy uncertainty.  
 Research shows that unethical practices are more likely in an unstable environment (Xie et al. 
2019). When one partner in an alliance fails or behaves unethically, the other partner gets adversely 
affected (Boone and Ivanov 2012; Piercy and Lane 2007).  To this end, the KPMG paper states that 
“Even though strategic alliances offer many advantages, success can be difficult to achieve due to the 
unique challenges this form of collaboration can present (KPMG 2018, 7).”  Hence, strategic alliances 
offer a unique setting to examine the extent to which relational risk, the intrinsic risk when firms are 
in a transactional relationship with another firm(s),  affects corporate capital investment activity.  
 In times of elevated policy uncertainty, strategic alliances are especially exposed to adverse 
selection problems where the partner might want to enter the alliance to alleviate their own 
(standalone) risk from policy uncertainty, which may lead to a lower chance of success for the alliance. 
The risk might also come from an increased risk of failure to meet regulators’, suppliers’ or customers’ 
expectations. Relational  risks increase during uncertain times, such as during periods of high policy 
uncertainty (Krishnan et al. 2016; Podolny 1994; Williamson 1985), as anticipated benefits from 
strategic alliances often fail to materialize (Gottschalg and Zollo 2007; Kale et al. 2002). During times 
of elevated policy uncertainty, the anticipated benefits are even less likely to be achieved as the parties 
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are more prone to act in their self-interest to navigate policy unpredictability rather than in the 
common interest of all parties. Hence, the free-rider problem may exacerbate during periods of high 
policy uncertainty. Further, increase in policy uncertainty is expected to result in higher contracting 
costs due to the need for greater detail in the contracts (Battigalli and Maggi 2008) and higher 
likelihood of testing the boundaries of incomplete contracts (Tirole 1999). 
To study the association between policy uncertainty and strategic alliances, we collect data 
from multiple sources. Our measure for policy uncertainty is an index developed by Baker et al. (2016). 
This index uses three components: the number of times a term related to policy uncertainty appears 
in a major newspaper, the uncertainty about the changes to the tax code, and the dispersion in forecasts 
of the consumer price index and government spending. This measure is superior to the other measures 
of policy uncertainty used in the past, such as stock return volatility, dispersion of analyst forecasts, 
and uncertainties relating to social security, monetary and fiscal policies. These measures often focus 
on a certain aspect of policy uncertainty, and fail to capture the overall policy uncertainty. The measure 
developed by Baker et al. (2016) addresses these concerns. We collect data about how many strategic 
alliances were undertaken by a firm in a particular year from the Securities Data Company (SDC) 
platinum database. We obtain macro-economic controls from various other sources, such as consumer 
surveys conducted by the University of Michigan and the Chicago Board Options Exchange.   
The univariate and multivariate results both demonstrate that higher policy uncertainty is 
associated with fewer strategic alliances. When we divide the sample into two groups based on the 
highest and lowest tercile of the level of policy uncertainty, we find that when policy uncertainty is 
low, 7.0 % of firms undertake alliances, but when it is high, only 3 % of firms undertake alliances. The 
difference is highly significant. A multivariate framework, which controls for a wide variety of firm-
level and macro-economic controls, confirms that when policy uncertainty increases from 80 to 110, 
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by approximately one standard deviation, the probability of undertaking at least one alliance in a given 
year drops from 5.74% to 4.26%. Considering that only 5.2% of firms undertake an alliance in a given 
year, this drop is significant.  
To verify that the association is not a simple correlation, but possibly causal, we conduct a 
difference-in-differences analysis using gubernatorial election at the State-level similar to Çolak et al. 
(2017). We conduct a state-year analysis where we use the gubernatorial election as a shock that creates 
policy uncertainty. For every State-year with an election, we identify a bordering State-year without an 
election and compare the change in the number of strategic alliances between the two groups. The 
idea being that the unobserved shock is the same in both states, but the observed shock only occurs 
in the state with an election. We find a significant drop in strategic alliances undertaken during times 
of high policy uncertainty for firms in States that had an election. Further, this effect of policy 
uncertainty is stronger when the election involves greater uncertainty such as a change in governor, or 
winning by a small margin.   
Overall, we document strong evidence that the number of new strategic alliances decreases 
during times of high policy uncertainty, and that this association is not simply correlational. To 
understand the mechanism by which policy uncertainty affects strategic alliances we investigate 
further: First, we ask whether firms are particularly wary of undertaking alliances with multiple partners 
during politically uncertain times. The greater the number of partners in an alliance, the greater the 
likelihood that one of the partners will either behave opportunistically, or will end up unable to honor 
their contractual undertakings, and hence jeopardize the alliance. If policy uncertainty increases the 
partner-related risk, we expect fewer alliances with multiple partners. Our results support this idea. 
Second, based on similar logic, we ask whether policy uncertainty has a stronger effect for firms that 
have partners that can shirk relatively easily,  for example, research-intensive firms or those belonging 
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to service industries (Erramilli and Rao 1993; Krishnan et al. 2016; Ulset 1996). We find results 
consistent with this notion. Third, we examine if policy uncertainty affects partnership in contract 
intensive industries to a greater extent. The idea being that cost of enforcing an intense contract might 
become higher as policy uncertainty increases. The results are consistent with the notion. The results 
of these four tests suggest that the possibility of increased opportunistic (mis)behavior of a partner is 
one of the key reasons firms are less likely to undertake an alliance during uncertain times.  
It is also possible that although strategic alliances involve a smaller investment, there is still 
exposure to investment irreversibility risk. While this may be a possibility, the additional tests we 
conduct suggest that increased relational risk, rather than investment irreversibility might be the 
primary reason why firms are reluctant to undertake new alliances during times of increased policy 
uncertainty. To this end, we do not find that firms that involve greater investment and deeper 
commitments such as manufacturing and supply alliances are particularly less likely during times of 
policy uncertainty.  We also do not find that policy uncertainty has a stronger effect on undertaking 
alliances with partners that have less redeployable assets. 
Our study raises two related questions. One, how does the effect of policy uncertainty on 
undertaking strategic alliance compare with its effect on a firm’s decision to acquire a target? Two, is 
the concern of investment’s irreversibility and relational risk different for acquisition, compared to 
alliances? We find that the effect of policy uncertainty on undertaking a strategic alliance is slightly 
stronger than its effect on acquisition. Our tests also show that policy uncertainty limits alliance 
formation because of increases in relational risk, but limits acquisition because of irreversibility 
concerns. 
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2. Related literature and hypotheses development 
2.1. Policy Uncertainty 
           Policy uncertainty is primarily rooted in politics. Increased political polarization can lead to 
higher political uncertainty. Hence, policy uncertainty is man-made, primarily emanating from   
anticipation of new government policies, or changes to existing policies that can potentially affect 
corporate decision-making. Political uncertainty is not fully diversifiable, as such elevated political 
uncertainty is accompanied by increases in risk premia and discount rates and thereby, adversely 
affecting the net present value (NPV) of future projects (Pástor and Veronesi 2013).  
2.2. Strategic Alliances 
            We define a strategic alliance as an agreement between two or more firms to achieve a common 
objective. Similarly, Yin and Shanley (2008) define strategic alliance as an “agreement between two or 
more firms to jointly manage assets and achieve strategic objectives” (p. 473).  A strategic alliance can 
be either a joint venture or a contractual alliance. Appendix A presents an example of an alliance. 
           Because we want to understand the role of relational risk in curtailing investment, we focus 
only on contractual strategic alliances and not joint-ventures. 3 In a contractual alliance (i.e., non-equity 
alliance), firms craft a contract and pool resources to work together with a common objective. In a 
joint venture, firms set up a new entity owned by the two firms or a larger number of parties. Examples 
of contractual alliance include licensing, marketing, and R&D. Contractual alliances are significantly 
more susceptible to relational risk than joint ventures. For example, Boone and Ivanov (2012) find 
that the bankruptcy of a partner adversely affects another partner in a contractual alliance, but not in 
joint ventures. 
                                                          
3 Including joint ventures does not change any of our conclusions. The results are similar. 
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2.3. Motivation for strategic alliances 
          The management literature examines factors that motivate firms to undertake strategic alliances 
(e.g., Gulati 1999; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; Lin and Darnall 2015). The transaction cost 
view of strategic alliances suggests that firms try to minimize the cost of resources they need to meet 
their strategic initiatives. There are various options open to firms to acquire specific resources, such 
as developing the resources organically, acquiring the resources from another firm, or entering into a 
strategic alliance with another firm. Strategic alliances represent a compromise between the first two 
options.  
The resource-based view (RBV) (e.g., Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1986) offers an alternative view 
on why firms seek to undertake alliances. It argues that a firm may not have adequate expertise to 
produce what it needs in order to improve its competitive edge over its competitors. Strategic alliances 
(along with acquisitions) are tools for the firm to obtain these valuable resources from outside.  
Sometimes strategic alliances are viewed as substitutes for acquisitions. The RBV also indicates 
when a strategic alliance might be more attractive than an acquisition. Acquisition can be costly and 
not viable when the resource that a firm is interested in acquiring is difficult to extricate from the 
remaining assets. Under such circumstances, a strategic alliance is a better option. The strategic alliance 
is also a tool to retain valuable resources. Occasionally, firms may have excess resources that need to 
be put to use, when a strategic alliance with another firm in need of these excess resources can be 
valuable to both parties. Strategic alliances can also be motivated simply to prevent a firm's  know-
how from decaying (Nelson and Winter 2009).  Such a collaboration may be a cheaper option than 
laying off researchers or selling off currently underutilized parts of the firm.  
Yin and Shanley (2008) examine industry determinants of the choice between acquisition and 
strategic alliance. They suggest that M&A will be more likely in physical-capital-intensive industries 
and those with a high level of tacit knowledge. Firms in capital-intensive industries have higher fixed 
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costs and depend upon economies of scale and scope for success. In these industries, acquiring a new 
firm can increase competitive advantage. A higher tacit knowledge means that most of the knowledge 
cannot be transferred in an alliance, and the costs of contracting are higher. They argue that an alliance 
will be more likely in industries characterized by a high level of specialized human assets. The reason 
for this is that it is hard to prevent employees from leaving, and if a firm were to buy another firm 
because of the employees, it is possible that the employees might leave the firm post-merger, 
particularly since M&As tend to create cultural clashes. 
2.4. Does policy uncertainty affect the propensity to undertake strategic alliances?  
 The effect of policy uncertainty on a firm’s propensity to undertake strategic alliances is unclear.  
Two opposing arguments can be made in this regard. Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) argue that 
depending on the extent of strategic advantage an investment is likely to confer, it may be 
advantageous to invest more during times of uncertainty. They propose the concept of growth option 
rooted in the idea that uncertainty can provide an opportunity to indulge in risky activities, such as 
attempts to build up new capabilities and gain the upper hand among one’s competitors because of 
the first-mover advantage. They state, “[W]hen strategic investment has a significant preemptive 
effect, it leads to higher market share, and thus a greater (relative) convexity of ex post profits relative 
to the case of no investment. As a result, even though the value of not investing increases with rising 
uncertainty, the value of the growth option increases even more” (p. 1022). Because strategic alliances 
constitute a low-cost approach to building new capabilities, firms may want to undertake more 
strategic alliances during times of high policy uncertainty.  
Uncertainty also increases the risk for the firm (Pástor and Veronesi 2013), which prompts 
the need to reduce such risk. Strategic alliances can be regarded as a relatively low-cost strategy to 
hedge (Devlin and Bleackley 1988). A firm could undertake multiple alliances spanning different 
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geographic regions and industries, thereby reducing the turbulence created due to policy uncertainty.  
Harrigan (1988) argues that expected market turbulence increases the co-operative behavior of firms. 
Dickson and Weaver (1997) use survey data from 433 Norwegian firms to examine the effect of 
perceived environmental uncertainty of different sorts of strategic alliance. They find that perception of 
general uncertainty, volatility due to technology, and internationalization increased the propensity to 
undertake an alliance. If policy uncertainty affects managers the same way as general uncertainty in 
Dickson and Weaver (1997), we could expect it to encourage the number of strategic alliances.  
Another reason strategic alliances could increase when policy uncertainty is high is that, 
compared to an acquisition, it is a low-cost way to acquire new skills and penetrate new markets. 
Unlike acquisition, which is a large irreversible investment and one that managers tend to avoid when 
policy uncertainty is high (Nguyen and Phan 2017), alliances are low-cost investments and not as costly 
to reverse as they are staggered, and managers have an option to abandon if they are not successful 
(McGrath et al. 2004; Smit and Trigeorgis 2012; Merton 1998). Insofar as managers view strategic 
alliances as a substitute for mergers, and consider it as a low cost investment, they might undertake 
more strategic alliances when policy uncertainty is high. Based on this line of reasoning, we propose 
the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1a: Policy uncertainty is associated with more strategic alliances. 
Policy uncertainty can also reduce the likelihood of an alliance as the relational (counterparty) 
risk increases during such times. Strategic alliances, by design, are inherently exposed to the risk that 
a partner in the alliance might act opportunistically. High policy uncertainty will lead to high 
environmental uncertainty that “results from changes in the environment that are difficult to predict, 
such as volatility in the product market as well as regulatory changes” (Krishnan et al. 2016, 2523), 
which in turn reduces transparency and increases the benefits of opportunistic behavior (Krishnan et 
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al. 2016; Williamson 1985). For example, Stein and Wang (2016) find that during periods of 
uncertainty, managers manipulate earnings to a greater extent.  
Further, in times of high policy uncertainty, strategic alliances can be even more exposed to 
adverse selection problems where one party enters the alliance to alleviate their own (standalone) risk 
from policy uncertainty leading to a lower chance of success for the alliance. Podolny (1994) argues 
that during periods of environmental uncertainty, consumer demand, input costs, and the competitive 
climate are difficult to assess, thereby making it hard to decipher the quality of the partner.  Firms bear 
the negative spillover when their partners fail to meet regulators’, suppliers’ or customers’ expectations 
(Boone and Ivanov 2012). These risks increase during uncertain times, such as during periods of high 
policy uncertainty (Krishnan et al. 2016; Podolny 1994; Williamson 1985).  
The free-rider problem is another aspect of relational risk that is likely to exacerbate during 
periods of high policy uncertainty. Anticipated benefits from strategic alliances often fail to materialize 
(Gottschalg and Zollo 2007; Kale et al. 2002). During times of elevated policy uncertainty, the 
anticipated benefits are even less likely to be achieved as the parties are more likely to act in their self-
interest to navigate policy unpredictability rather than in the common interest of all parties associated 
with the strategic alliance.  
Besides relational risk, arguably, the irreversibility of investment could also adversely affect the 
incentive to undertake an alliance. We argue earlier that because strategic alliances are substitutes for 
M&A and require less investment, it could increase when policy uncertainty increases because 
managers may choose a substitute where the investment irreversibility is less severe. However, it can 
also be argued that although the investments involved in alliances are less compared to acquisitions, 
it still involves committing resources. Hence, managers may want to wait until policy uncertainty is 
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resolved before they undertake a strategic alliance. Based on the above discussion, we propose the 
following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1b: Policy uncertainty is associated with fewer strategic alliances. 
2.5. Why might policy uncertainty be associated with fewer strategic alliances? 
2.5.1. The role of relational risk 
 In the preceding discussion, we hypothesized that firms would shy away from undertaking 
alliances during times when policy uncertainty is high because they fear greater relational risk such as 
an increased likelihood of counterparty risk, and greater incentives for the partners to misbehave 
during such times. If the probability of a partner misbehaving indeed goes up during times of policy 
uncertainty, then we should observe that strategic alliances where the risk of a partner misbehaving is 
higher are particularly sensitive to political uncertainty. For example, we should find that alliances that 
involve multiple partners are particularly unlikely during such times. The idea is that the greater the 
number of partners involved in an alliance, the greater the probability that one of the partners will 
behave opportunistically. Therefore, we hypothesize the following. 
Hypothesis 2a:  When policy uncertainty is high, there will be fewer alliances with multiple partners.  
Counterparty (or relational) risk is also higher when the partner belongs to R&D-intensive 
industries or the service industry. Krishnan et al. (2016) note the following: 
….the potential for opportunistic gains in the presence of behavioral uncertainty is higher in 
alliances belonging to R&D-intensive industries, where monitoring and evaluating intellectual 
activity is difficult (Ulset, 1996), and in alliances belonging to service industries, where 
monitoring performance is hard, owing to inseparability of production and consumption 
(Erramilli and Rao, 1993)…( p. 2523) 
 
If our line of logic that increased relational risk is the reason firms shy away from undertaking new 
alliances is correct, then we should expect a negative association between policy uncertainty and the 
volume of strategic alliances undertaken to be stronger in industries where the probability of relational 
risk is higher.  This leads us to the following hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 2b:  The effect of policy uncertainty on the undertaking of strategic alliances is stronger when 
the partner in the alliance is R&D-intensive or belongs to the service industries. 
 
Relational risk is also likely to be higher in alliances with partners in contract intensive industries 
such as automobiles, aircraft, computer and electronic equipment. In these industries, inputs are 
customized and are not sold in thick markets. The relational risk will be less in industries that are less 
contract-intensive such as poultry processing, flour milling, petroleum refiners where inputs are not 
customized and they are sold in thick markets. Nunn (2007) finds that countries with low-quality law 
enforcement specialize in producing goods that require less intensive contracts, as they have cost 
disadvantage in producing goods that require a more intense contract. This line of thought can be 
extended to the way policy uncertainty affects alliance formation. When the expectation that a partner 
may not be able to fulfill their contract in the future increases, firms will shy away from forming 
alliances that involve more intense contracts. Therefore, we hypothesize the following.   
Hypothesis 2c:  The effect of policy uncertainty on the undertaking of strategic alliances is stronger when the 
partner belongs to an industry involving high contract-intensity. 
 
 
2.5.2. The role of investment’s irreversibility  
A significant body of theoretical and empirical literature supports the view that firms delay 
investments during periods of increased policy uncertainty. Indeed, research that examines the effect 
of policy uncertainty on investments shows that the effect of policy uncertainty is stronger for 
investments with greater degree of irreversibility. For example, Bonaime et al. (2018) find that the 
adverse effect of policy uncertainty on the acquisition of a target is much stronger if the target belongs 
to an industry with higher PPE-to-assets ratio, which is a proxy for the degree of irreversibility of the 
acquisition, or to an industry with lower asset redeployability.  A similar line of argument would suggest 
that, although the amount of investments in strategic alliances is considerably less than that in an 
acquisition, firms would prefer to delay strategic alliances with greater irreversible investment.   
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Compared to licensing and marketing alliances, alliances involved in manufacturing, and supply 
are likely to involve deeper commitments and more irreversible investments. Hence, we expect policy 
uncertainty to have a stronger effect on manufacturing and supply alliances, compared to licensing 
and marketing alliances4. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: The adverse effect of policy uncertainty on alliances associated with a greater degree of 
irreversibility (e.g., manufacturing) is stronger compared to that for alliances associated with more reversible 
investments (e.g., licensing and marketing). 
       Bonaime et al. (2018) find that firms are even less likely to acquire a target in industries that have 
less redeployable assets as they are less reversible. If irreversibility is a concern in the formation of 
alliances, it is possible that managers may shy away from forming alliances with partners in industries 
with a lower level of asset redeployability as those alliances may be less reversible. Hence, we make 
the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3b:  The negative effect of enhanced policy uncertainty on strategic alliance creations is stronger 
when the prospective partner belongs to an industry that has assets with lower redeployability.   
 
2.6. The effect of policy uncertainty on strategic alliance formations vis-a-vis acquisitions 
As discussed earlier, investment irreversibility, as a determining factor, is more important for 
mergers and acquisitions, while relational risk is of greater prominence for strategic alliance formations 
because they necessitate continued cooperation of the partners involved throughout the alliance 
period. Hence we hypothesize the following. 
Hypothesis 4: Increase in policy uncertainty adversely affects strategic alliance formations to a greater extent 
when they are associated with greater relational risk (e.g., greater contracting intensity), but not when they are 
less reversible (e.g., lower asset redeployability), while the adverse effect of enhanced policy uncertainty on 
acquisitions is expected to be greater with increased asset irreversibility, but not with increased relational risk. 
                                                          
4 R&D alliances are also relatively irreversible, but we do not include them as these alliances also have higher growth 
options and many are attractive during policy uncertainty. Hence, the inclusion of these alliances would mask the effect 
of irreversibility and make it difficult to interpret the result. 
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3. Data, variables, and sample formation process  
3.1. Measuring policy uncertainty  
We use the policy uncertainty index developed by Baker et al. (2016). These data are constructed 
monthly and is publically available. 5  They develop an index for economic uncertainty by constructing 
a weighted average of (i) the frequency of keywords such as “economy”, “uncertain”, “deficit”, 
“regulation” etc. in 10 leading newspapers in the U.S6., (ii) the uncertainty associated with changes in 
tax code, which is the dollar-weighted federal tax code provision, set to expire in 10 years, reported 
by the Congressional Budget Office, and (iii) disagreement in forecasting monetary policy and fiscal 
policy constructed using the government spending uncertainty index, and the inflation uncertainty 
index.  The overall index is constructed by weighting these indexes, 1/2, 1/6, and 1/3 respectively. 
Their measure peaks near tight presidential elections, wars, terror attacks such as 9/11, and during 
battles over fiscal policy and the debt-ceiling.  
Because our analysis is at the firm-year level, we construct a yearly index using the monthly 
data. The measure of policy uncertainty is the weighted average policy uncertainty in the past 12 
months. Policy uncertainty in the immediate past is going to affect the undertaken of strategic alliances. 
In other words, compared to uncertainty in January 2010, the uncertainty in December 2010 is going 
to have a greater impact on strategic alliances undertaken in 2011. Thus, we attach much more weight 
to the policy uncertainty in December 2010. We construct the yearly policy uncertainty index as 
follows.  
 
                                                          
5 http://www.policyuncertainty.com/us_monthly.html 
6 These newspapers include The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, USA Today, The Boston Globe, 
The Dallas Morning News, the Los Angeles Times, the San Francisco Chronicle, the Chicago Tribune, and the Miami Herald. 
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Policy Uncertainty t = ((Policy Uncertainty) (y-12)*12 + Policy Uncertainty (y-11)*11 + Policy Uncertainty (y-10)*10 + 
Policy Uncertainty (y-9)*9 + Policy Uncertainty (y-8)*8 + Policy Uncertainty (y-7)*7 + Policy Uncertainty (y-6)*6 + Policy 
Uncertainty (y-5)*5 + Policy Uncertainty (y-4)*4 + Policy Uncertainty (y-3)*3 + Policy Uncertainty (y-2)*2 + Policy 
Uncertainty (y-1))/ 78 
 
where, Policy Uncertainty (y-12), refers to the policy uncertainty in December, Policy Uncertainty (y-11) refers to 
the policy uncertainty in November and so on. Our approach is similar to Nguyen and Phan (2017). 
The only difference between our approach and theirs is that instead of taking the weighted average of 
the last three months, we take the weighted average of the last 12 months.7 
3.2. Measuring the number of strategic alliances 
We retrieve the alliance data over the twenty-nine years between 1990 and 2019 from the SDC 
Platinum database. This database is regarded as one of the most comprehensive databases for strategic 
alliances (Anand and Khanna 2000). The SDC obtains alliances from newspapers and corporate press 
releases. We count the number of strategic alliances a firm undertakes each year. From this dataset, 
we obtain the six-digit CUSIP of the firm, the year of the alliance, and the total number of alliances 
that the firm initiated that year. We include all types of contractual alliances, including licensing 
agreements, marketing or distribution agreements, research and development agreements, technology 
transfer agreements, and others.  
3.3. Control variables 
The literature on strategic alliances and policy uncertainty motivates our choice of control 
variables. Because our goal is to examine how policy uncertainty affects the propensity to undertake a 
                                                          
7 Our results are similar if we follow the procedure as in Nguyen and Phan (2017). They calculate policy uncertainty as 
follows: Policy Uncertainty t = (Policy Uncertainty (t-1)*3+ Policy Uncertainty (t-2)*2 + (Policy Uncertainty) (t-3))/6. Our results are also 
qualitatively similar if we use the arithmetic mean rather than the weighted average. 
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strategic alliance, the dependent variable is whether the firm engaged in a strategic alliance in a given 
year, and the key independent variable is the measure for policy uncertainty in the preceding year. The 
control variables we use are largely based on prior studies that examine either the propensity to 
undertake a strategic alliance (Gulati 1995; Kim and Higgins 2007) or the effect of policy uncertainty 
on investment decisions (Bonaime et al. 2018; Gulen and Ion 2016; Nguyen and Phan 2017).  
 At the firm level we control for the size of total assets, the age of the firm, the market-to-book 
ratio, the cash-to-assets ratio, and the ratio of R&D expense to total assets. We also use an indicator 
variable that measures whether the firm has any R&D expenses, income, gross profit margin, the ratio 
of debt to assets, the ratio of PPE to assets, and sales growth. A large firm with high R&D expenditures 
and more cash is likely to be more aggressive at entering into strategic alliances.  
At the macroeconomic level, we control for the dispersion in sales growth, volatility of real 
earnings, an index that measures future economic activity, a measure that captures consumer 
expectations, an index that captures the real earnings of firms in the U.S., the current economic 
conditions, consumer sentiment, an index that measures consumer sentiments using surveys, the 
cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings index, and a measure of liquidity in the economy. These controls 
are used because they capture the current economic condition and provide a view of future economic 
conditions. These measures can affect the policies that politicians put forward, and they can also affect 
a firm’s incentive to undertake an alliance. For example, during a downturn, politicians debate 
economic policies more frequently and therefore increase policy uncertainty, and firms are more 
cautious about their investment decisions such as forming an alliance. We also control for the time 
trend because research indicates that CEOs are increasingly leaning toward undertaking strategic 
alliances. In Appendix B we summarize all the variables we use in the study. 
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3.4. Sample formation process 
The sample covers 170,117 firm-years, 17,567 firms, and 43 different industries based on Fama-
French’s 48 industry classification spanning the period 1990 to 2019. Panel A of Appendix C 
summarizes the sample selection process. The sample selection is as follows: We start with the entire 
Compustat dataset that covers the period from 1990 to 2019 and consists of 336,243 firm-years. We 
remove firms that are not headquartered in the U.S. (42,317), and firms with missing data on total 
assets or total sales (46,385). Next, using the SDC Platinum Database we obtain the number of 
alliances in a firm-year. When there is no mention of the firm undertaking any alliance in a year, we 
consider the firm to have formed zero alliances that year. Next, sequentially, we remove firm-years 
that belong to the finance or utility industry (56,303); and that have missing values for Market-to-Book 
(9,490), Sales growth (8,417), PPE (2,625), and other controls (589). 
Panel B of Appendix C tabulates the number of observations by industry. Most observations 
in our sample are from business services, electronic equipment, pharmaceutical products, and retail 
industries. Together, these industries account for approximately one-third of the sample. Panel C 
tabulates the number of observations, the number of alliances, and the number of firms that undertake 
alliances by year. This panel shows that the 1990s witnessed more strategic alliances than the 2000s. 
Panel D indicates frequency of the number of alliances a firm undertook in a year, if they did form at 
least one alliance, 74% of firms undertook only one alliance, approximately 16% undertook two 
alliances, and the rest undertook three or more alliances. Panel E indicates that about 93% of the 
alliances had only one partner, while about 5% had two additional partners. Only approximately 0.42% 
of the firms undertook an alliance that involved six other partners. Panel F tabulates the number of 
the alliances by their types. The most common type of strategic alliance is a marketing alliance, and 
the least common is a funding alliance. 
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3.5. Summary statistics and correlations  
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the data used in our baseline regression. The mean 
of Alliance Dummy is 0.052. This number means that every year, on average, 5.2% of firms in our 
sample undertook at least one new alliance. The mean of Policy Uncertainty is about 103, and the 
standard deviation is approximately 25. 
  Table 2 presents the correlation matrix. The correlation between Alliance Dummy and Policy 
Uncertainty is -0.07 and significant at 0.1% (p-value < 0.001). Policy Uncertainty is also negatively and 
significantly correlated with macroeconomic factors such as the current economic conditions and 
leading business cycle indicators. 
<Insert Table 1> 
 
<Insert Table 2> 
4. Results 
The results are organized as follows: First, we test Hypotheses 1a and 1b under univariate and 
multivariate settings. We also use a difference-in-differences analysis. In all of these tests, we do not 
find support for Hypothesis 1a. We find support for Hypothesis 1b, namely, the greater the policy 
uncertainty, the lower the likelihood that the firm undertakes a strategic alliance.  
Next, we focus on Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c, 3a, and 3b to understand better why we find a 
negative association between policy uncertainty and strategic alliances: Does the number of strategic 
alliances decline due to an increase in relational (counterparty) risk (Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c)? Or, 
because of investment irreversibility (Hypotheses 3a and 3b)? We find support for Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 
and 2c consistent with the idea that the effect of policy uncertainty is stronger for alliances where 
relational risk matters more. We do not find support for Hypotheses 3a and 3b. In other words, in 
contrast to the reason documented in previous studies related to mergers and acquisitions, it does not 
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appear that investment irreversibility is a primary driver of why firms undertake fewer strategic 
alliances when policy uncertainty increases.  
In Hypothesis 4, we find further evidence that policy uncertainty affects corporate alliance 
formations via the relational (or counterparty) risk channel, while acquisitions are affected due to 
investment irreversibility.  
4.1. Policy uncertainty and strategic alliances 
4.1.1. Univariate tests 
In Figure 1 we plot a graph of No. of Alliances and Policy Uncertainty over the sample period. The 
X-axis depicts the month and year, and the Y-axis (left) has the rolling sum of the number of alliances 
in the preceding 12 months, with policy uncertainty shown on the right axis. This figure indicates that 
fewer strategic alliances are undertaken during periods of high policy uncertainty.  
<Insert Figure 1> 
 To conduct a formal test, we divide the sample into three groups based on the level of Policy 
Uncertainty and calculate the mean of Alliance Dummy. The results, presented graphically in Figure 2, 
demonstrate that when policy uncertainty is in the lowest tercile 7% of firms undertake an alliance, 
and when it is in the highest tercile, only 3% of the firms undertake at least one alliance. A two-tailed 
t-test shows that the difference is statistically significant due to a p-value of less than 0.001%.   
<Insert Figure 2> 
4.1.2. Multivariate test  
To estimate the effect of policy uncertainty on the undertaking of strategic alliances in a 
multivariate setting, we use the following logit model:  
Alliances Dummy it   =  α + β× Policy Uncertainty t-1 + δ× X it+ λ × M t+ Time trend t  
                                 + Industry Indicators i + ε it                           (1) 
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where i refers to the firm and t is the year. Alliances Dummy it   is an indicator variable that is equal 
to one if a firm undertakes a strategic alliance that year. Policy Uncertainty t-1 is the policy uncertainty in 
the preceding year. X it is a set of firm-level control variables as follows: Ln(assets) is the natural 
logarithm of the total assets; Age is the age of the firm;  Market-to-book is the ratio of the market value 
to the book value; Cash is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents of the firms to the total assets; R&D 
is the ratio of R&D expenditure to the total assets of the firm; R&D dummy is a dummy variable that 
indicates whether the firm’s R&D expenditure in that year is missing; EBIT is the ratio of earnings 
before income and taxes (EBIT) to total assets; Gross margin is the sales revenue minus its cost of 
goods sold (COGS) that is divided by total sales revenue;  Debt  is the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets; PPE is the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total assets; and M t is a set of year-
level control variables. 
 The year-level controls are as follows: Sales growth is the log of sales divided by  previous year's 
sales; Sales growth dispersion is the cross-sectional standard deviation in the sales growth of all firms for 
that year; Real earnings volatility is the 12-month rolling standard deviation in real earnings; business cycle 
indicator is an index that measures the future economic activity that is based on 11 leading economic 
indicators that appear to have significant predictive power over future GDP growth; Real earnings index 
is an index of the real earnings of publicly traded firms in the US; Current economic conditions is an index 
that measures the current economic condition through surveys; CAPE Shiller index is Shiller's cyclically 
adjusted price-to-earnings index; BAA-Fed fund rate is the difference in the yields of the Moody's 
seasoned corporate Baa-rated bonds and the Fed’s fund rate; and Time trend is the numerical value of 
the year. To account for the possibility that errors might be correlated by firm and year, we cluster the 
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standard errors by firm and year8. We provide the details of the variables and their sources in Appendix 
B. 
The results of the logit model are consistent with Hypothesis 1b, that is, when policy 
uncertainty is high, a firm has a lower probability of undertaking a strategic alliance. The results are 
reported in Table 3. The table shows the coefficients from the logit model. The coefficient for Policy 
Uncertainty is negative and significant at a p-value < 0.001 regardless of whether we use a full set of 
controls that include the firm level, year level, and the time trend (column 1), only the firm level 
(column 2), or no controls (column 3). Moreover, the coefficient for Policy Uncertainty continues to be 
significant at a p-value < 0.001 even when we use a firm fixed effect (column 4). A firm fixed effect 
controls for all time-invariant firm characteristics. A fixed-effect test, by construction, does not use 
firms that did not undertake any strategic alliance during the sample period; hence the sample reduces 
by approximately 65%, from 170,117 to 59,617.   
The economic significance of the coefficient is quite large based on column 1 of Table 3. For 
example, holding the other variables constant at their mean, an increase in Policy Uncertainty of 30 points 
(from 80 to 110) reduces the probability of undertaking a strategic alliance from 0.0522 to 0.0392 (see 
Figure 3)9— a drop of approximately 25%. A 30-point increase in policy uncertainty is only slightly 
above an increase of one standard deviation. The standard deviation in Policy Uncertainty is 25.257.  
<Insert Table 3> 
<Insert Figure 3> 
  
                                                          
8 The coefficient of Policy Uncertainty continues to be highly significant (p-values< 0.001) when we use alternative 
clustering (by firm, year, industry, or industry and year). 
9 We use the command “margins” in STATA to obtain the marginal probability of forming an alliance when other 
variables are held at the mean and “marginsplot” to plot a graph.  
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4.1.3. Robustness checks 
Table 4 reports the results of robustness tests. Rather than use a logit model, we use a linear 
probability model (i.e., OLS) and confirm that the association between Policy Uncertainty and the Alliance 
Dummy remains significant. These results are reported in column 1 of Panel A of Table 4.  The results 
reported in column 2 show that the results are also robust when we use No. of Alliances as the dependent 
variable, replacing Alliance Dummy. The advantage of using No. of Alliances is that it accounts for the 
firms that reduced their number of strategic alliances but did not reduce them to zero. This contrasts 
with the use of Alliance Dummy, which does not consider the firm that reduces its number of alliances 
from, for example, two to one. The results reported in column 3 indicate that this association is also 
robust when we use a negative binomial regression.  
The results reported in Panel B indicate that the Hypothesis 1b holds for different types of 
alliances. The results reported in Panel C indicate that this hypothesis also holds for each individual 
component of the policy uncertainty measure (i.e. News component, Government Spend component, CPI 
component, and Tax component).10  
<Insert Table 4> 
4.1.4. Difference-in-differences analysis      
To address the issue of causality, we follow Çolak et al. (2017) and use neighboring-states, 
difference-in-differences method.11 As in their study we use an election in the state as a measure of 
policy uncertainty. For every state-year, we identify the states that did not have an election but that 
shared a border with the state that had an election.  Next, we compare the number of strategic 
                                                          
10 In unreported tests, we also verify that the results hold when we remove observations from 2008, 2008 and 2009, 
2007-2009, or 2007-2010. 
 
11 Çolak et al. (2017) use this method to examine the effect of political uncertainty on an IPO offering. 
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alliances. Because the neighboring states face the same unobserved shocks, when we take the 
difference in the dependent variable, the effect of the unobserved shocks cancels out, and the 
difference therefore, in the number of strategic alliances, can be attributed to the uncertainty due to 
the election.  
           The model we use can be summarized in the following equation: 
 
 
Д No. of Alliances i, j, t = β× Election Year i, t  + δ× Д X i, j, t+  ε it   (2) 
 
where Д No. of Alliances i, j, t   is the total number of strategic alliances that occurred in a state with an 
election (i) minus the total number of alliances that occurred in a neighboring state without an election 
(j) in year t.  Election Year is a dummy variable that is equal to one if year t is an election year in the 
state the firm is headquartered as in Çolak et al. (2017). By design, our dependent variable can only be 
constructed if State i has an election. Therefore, the Election Year variable will always be one. That is, 
it is a constant. X i, j, t  is the difference in the observable state characteristics. We use the following 
measures: the lagged value of the average number of firms in the two states (based on COMPUSTAT), 
the lagged value of the number of strategic alliances in the state, the lagged value of growth in state 
GDP per capita, the lagged value of the unemployment rate, and year dummies to control for time-
invariant macroeconomic factors that might affect the strategic alliance in a given year. 
States without neighboring states (Alaska and Hawaii) are automatically dropped from this 
sample. In our sample, on average there are three neighboring states. Thirty-six of the states with 
elections share a border with at least one state without an election. Tennessee and Missouri have eight 
neighboring states.  
 If the coefficient for Election Year is negative, it indicates that during an election year, the 
number of new strategic alliances decreases. Put differently, policy uncertainty reduces the likelihood 
of a strategic alliance. We can also easily interpret the economic significance. The magnitude of this 
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coefficient indicates how many fewer alliances were undertaken in a state with an election, compared 
to a neighboring state where there was no election.  
 The results of this difference-in-differences analysis are reported in Panel A of Table 5. The 
dependent variable in this regression is the difference in the number of alliances in a state with an 
election minus the number of strategic alliances in a neighboring state without an election. The results 
reported in column 2 show that the coefficient for Election Year is -0.0558 and significant at 1%. That 
is, during an election year there are 0.0558 fewer alliances undertaken. This number is significant, 
because the average of the difference in the number of alliances between the two states is -2.045, and 
therefore a reduction is equivalent to a drop of 2.72%.  
 In Panel B, we report the results of tests that ask if the difference-in-differences results are 
stronger for elections when policy uncertainty is higher. Following Çolak et al. (2017) we consider an 
election to be more uncertain when (i) the election leads to a change in the governor and if she wins 
by less than 5% margin, or  (ii) the incumbent is not a candidate for governor on the election for 
reasons other than expiration of term limit, (iii)  the difference in the percentage of winning margin is 
less than the median. In each of these instances, we find that the results are stronger when elections 
are uncertain. 
 In Panel C, we report the results of the dynamic difference-in-differences analysis.  In this 
panel, the dependent variable is # of Alliances in a state with election. The results show that pre-election 
years are not associated with an increase or decrease in alliances, but after the election is over there is 
a jump in the number of strategic alliances formed. This suggests that some managers would rather 
wait for the election to be over to get into an alliance.  
<Insert Table 5> 
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4.2. The role of relational (or counterparty) risk in strategic alliance formations 
4.2.1. Strategic alliances with multiple partners  
We find results consistent with Hypothesis 2a indicating that firms are less likely to undertake 
alliances that have more than two partners during times of increased policy uncertainty. This finding 
means that increased relational risk may be a reason why firms prefer to not undertake strategic 
alliances during times of enhanced policy uncertainty. The results are based on a subsample of firms 
that undertake at least one alliance during our sample period. Using this subsample, we examine 
whether firms are less likely to undertake alliances that have more than two partners. The results are 
reported in Panel A of Table 6.  
The dependent variable in these tests is More than two partners in alliance, an indicator variable 
that equals one if the number of partners in the alliance is more than two.12 Regardless of whether we 
use an extensive set of controls (column 1), control only for firm characteristics (column 2), or no 
controls (column 3), the coefficient for Policy Uncertainty continues to be negative and statistically 
significant. When Policy Uncertainty increases from 80 to 110, a change of approximately one standard 
deviation, the probability of having multiple partners drops from 10.39% to 8.48%, holding all other 
variables at the mean. 
<Insert Table 6> 
4.2.2. The effect of policy uncertainty when partners are in R&D-intensive or in service 
industries 
Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, we find that the adverse effect of policy uncertainty on alliance 
formation is much stronger when the partner is R&D intensive or when it belongs to a service 
industry. We examine two subsamples of firms in: (a) R&D intensive, and (b) service industries. 
                                                          
12 Rarely does a firm undertake two or more alliances. In such cases, if any one of the alliances has multiple partners, we 
consider the indicator variable to be one. 
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  In Table 6 (Panel B) column 1, we examine cases where the firm allied with prospective 
partners that reported some R&D expenditures and where the firm did not form any alliance. In 
column 2, the sample consists of instances where the firm allied with partners that did not report any 
R&D expenditure, or where the firm did not form any alliance. We find that the coefficient of Policy 
Uncertainty is negative in both columns, but significantly larger in magnitude in column 1 indicating 
that Policy Uncertainty has a greater adverse effect on forming alliances with a research-intensive firm. 
The results of the pooled analysis in column 3 also echo the same findings.  
 Panel C’s column 1 reports results for strategic alliances formed with partners in the service 
industry13 or that did not form any alliance. Column 2 reports the results of the subsample that consists 
of alliances formed when the alliances involve all industries except services and instances where the 
firm did not form any alliance. The results show that the coefficient of Policy Uncertainty is significantly 
larger when alliances are with partners in the service industry indicating that policy uncertainty reduces 
the likelihood of alliance formation with partners in the service industry to a greater extent. Column 
3, which reports the pooled analysis, also demonstrates that alliance formation decreases to a greater 
extent when the partner is from a service industry. Overall, the findings in this section support the 
notion that strategic alliances that are exposed to a greater degree of relation risk are affected more 
adversely from increased policy uncertainty. 
4.2.3. Strategic alliance and contract intensity 
Panel D of Table 6 reports the results consistent with Hypothesis 2c. Policy uncertainty affects 
the likelihood of alliance formation to a greater extent when the partner is from a contract- intensive 
industry. Nunn (2007) provides a list of the twenty most and least contract intensive industries. We 
                                                          
13 We consider the partner as belonging to the service industry if based on Fama-French industry classifications, it is 
classified as household services (33), or business service (34). 
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use this data to classify the partners.14 We find that in a subsample of firm-years where a partner 
belongs to a most contract-intensive industry, the effect is much stronger (column 1), compared to 
the subsample of where the partner belongs to an industry with lower contract intensity (column 2). 
A pooled analysis reported in column 3 also reports the same finding. The coefficient of Policy 
Uncertainty*Contract Intensive Industry is negative and highly significant. Contract Intensive Industry is one 
when the partner belongs to an industry that is ranked among the top twenty industries requiring the 
most intense contracts. Similar to the findings in the preceding section, these results reinforce the 
notion that relation risk plays a significant role in determining the effect of increased policy uncertainty 
on strategic alliances. 
4.3. The role of investment irreversibility on strategic alliances 
 
4.3.1. Alliances that involve deeper commitments  
To examine to what extent investment irreversibility plays a role in affecting strategic alliances 
under enhanced policy uncertainty regimes we create two subsamples. The two groups are created 
based on the type of alliance. In one group, we consider manufacturing, supply alliances, and funding 
alliances. These are the types that are much more costly to reverse. In another group, we consider 
licensing and marketing alliances, ones where the cost of reversing is lower. The results reported in 
Panel A of Table 7 show that the coefficient of Policy Uncertainty is not significantly different between 
the two groups. The p-value for the test that they are equal is 0.7106. A pooled test that uses both the 
subsample and an interaction term also shows that the effect of policy uncertainty is not significantly 
different between the two groups. Hence, the results are inconsistent with Hypothesis 3a. In other 
                                                          
14 Nunn (2007)’s Table II lists the 20 least and most contract intensive industries. We take this list and code these same 
industries to be the least and most contract intensive industries for all the years in our sample. The least contract intensive 
industries have a median value of 0.132, while most contract intensive industries have a median value of 0.872. The least 
contract intensive industry is poultry processing with an intensity score of 0.024, and the most contract- intensive is the 
automobile and light truck manufacturing industry with an intensity score of 0.98. 
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words, we do not find that the effect of policy uncertainty on undertaking strategic alliances is stronger 
for those alliances that involve deeper commitments and are difficult to reverse. 
<Insert Table 7> 
4.3.2. Alliances with partners in irreversible industries  
  We do not find that partnering with firms that belong to industries that have lower asset 
redeployability is less likely. Panel B of Table 7 reports the results. We use the measure of asset 
redeployability as in Kim and Kung (2016) and divide the sample into two groups based on whether 
the partners belong to industries with high or low asset redeployability. The coefficient of Policy 
Uncertainty is not significantly different between the two groups. The p-value for the test that the 
coefficients are equal is 0.3573. We also construct an indicator variable Asset Redeployable that is one if 
the asset redeployability of the partner is above the median and zero otherwise, and interact it with 
Policy Uncertainty and conduct a pooled analysis (column 3). Hence, these results are also inconsistent 
with Hypothesis 3b.  
4.4 Policy uncertainty’s effect on undertaking strategic alliances vis-a-vis acquisitions 
Relational risk does not appear to be the channel by which policy uncertainty affects the 
decision to acquire a target. In results reported in Panel A of Table 8, where the dependent variable is 
the Acquisition Dummy, we do not find that policy uncertainty affects the likelihood of an acquisition 
to a greater extent when the target belongs to contract-intensive industries, which is a proxy for 
instance when relational risk might matter more. However, consistent with prior literature, investment 
irreversibility appears to be a reason why firms avoid acquisitions when policy uncertainty increases. 
The results we report in Panel B show that Policy Uncertainty affects the likelihood of mergers much 
more strongly when the target’s assets are less redeployable, consistent with Bonaime et al. (2018).  
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We reach the same conclusion when we introduce Policy Uncertainty*Contract Intensive Industry 
and Policy Uncertainty*Asset Redeployable in the same regression with Acquisition Dummy as the dependent 
variable. The coefficient of Policy Uncertainty*Contract Intensive Industry is insignificant. In contrast, the 
coefficient of Policy Uncertainty*Asset Redeployable is positive and significant (Panel C column 1), 
suggesting that the decision to acquire may not be affected by relational risk, but is affected by the 
cost of irreversibility of investment. In contrast, when Alliance Dummy is the dependent variable, the 
coefficient of Policy Uncertainty*Contract Intensive Industry, is negative and significant, while the coefficient 
of Policy Uncertainty*Asset Redeployable is insignificant (column 2) suggesting that relational risk matters 
for strategic alliances, whereas investment irreversibility is not a significant factor driving strategic 
alliances. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 4. These findings reveal that, under enhanced 
policy uncertainty, the primary channel affecting strategic alliance formations is quite different from 
that influencing corporate acquisitions.  
<Insert Table 8> 
4.5. Additional analysis 
We examine if the probability of abandoning a strategic alliance increases under enhanced 
policy uncertainty. Additionally, we examine the stock market reaction to strategic alliance 
announcements during enhanced policy uncertainty, and compare the relative effect of policy 
uncertainty on alliances vis-à-vis acquisitions  
4.5.1. Are firms more likely to abandon corporate alliances during increased policy uncertainty 
regimes? 
A key argument in our study is that forming an alliance becomes less attractive during times of 
increased policy uncertainty because of the increased likelihood of counterparty misbehavior.  If that 
is indeed the case, a firm should be more likely to withdraw from an alliance already in place during 
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such times because as the uncertainty increases the expected net present value to continue with the 
alliance falls and, in some instances, may even become negative. 
Our data allow us to examine these questions. Some of the alliances that are announced are 
broken off even before they start. The dates when these alliances were broken off are retrieved from 
the SDC Platinum Database. To examine whether firms are more likely to withdraw from an alliance 
during times of uncertainty, we construct the variable Withdrawn. For each firm-year, this variable 
equals one when there is a strategic alliance abandonment announcement, and zero otherwise. 
When we divide the sample into two groups based on whether the period involves high or low 
policy uncertainty, we find that the mean of the variable Withdrawn is 0.027 when policy uncertainty is 
low, and 0.032 when it is high. This is a 18% increase.  The multivariate results reported in Table 9 
are largely consistent with our prediction in columns 2 and 3, where we do not control for macro-
economic variables. However, when we control for macroeconomic factors, we find that the Policy 
Uncertainty is not significant.   
In unreported tests, we investigate if Policy Uncertainty is associated with a higher likelihood of 
withdrawals in subsamples where relational risks are high (e.g., the partner is R&D intensive, or from 
the service industry, or belongs to a contract-intensive sector). We find that the coefficient is positive, 
and t-statistics are higher, but the coefficients are still not statistically significant. From these tests, we 
conclude that there isn’t convincing evidence that firms are likely to abandon already formed strategic 
alliances when policy uncertainty increases.  
<Insert Table 9> 
4.5.2. Policy uncertainty and market response to strategic alliance announcements 
We contend that strategic alliances undertaken during high policy uncertainty regimes pass a 
higher bar and investors recognize them as higher quality ventures.  A similar argument is made in 
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two studies that find that firms are less likely to acquire another firm during times of high policy 
uncertainty (Bonaime et al. 2018; Nguyen and Phan 2017). Both these studies report more positive 
investor reaction to acquisitions undertaken during times of high policy uncertainty. In this vein, we 
expect the CAR for alliances undertaken during times of uncertainty also to be higher. 
Our empirical evidence supports this notion. We divide the sample into two groups based on 
whether the alliance was undertaken in the years with high policy uncertainty separated by the median 
Policy Uncertainty. Next, we test whether the CAR (-1, +1) and CAR (-2, +2)15 are greater for alliances 
undertaken during periods of high policy uncertainty vis-à-vis those announced at other times. The 
results indicate that CAR (-1, +1) is approximately 38% greater (0.0113/0.0082), and CAR (-2, +2) is 
33 % (0.0118/0.0089) greater for high policy uncertainty periods. These differences in the CARs are 
statistically significant due to a two-tailed t-test with a p-value <0.005. These univariate results also 
hold in a multivariate framework. We continue to find that Policy Uncertainty is positively associated 
with CAR (-1, +1) and CAR (-2, +2), after controlling for firm-level characteristics and macro-
economic conditions. Panels A and B of Table 10 present the univariate and multivariate results, 
respectively. 
<Insert Table 10> 
4.5.3. The relative economic effect of policy uncertainty on alliance formations compared to 
acquisitions 
Our final analysis compares the economic impact of policy uncertainty on the likelihood of 
alliance formation with the impact on the likelihood of acquisitions. We know that firms delay 
acquisitions during high policy uncertainty periods because these investments are difficult to reverse. 
                                                          
15 Following Brown and Warner (1985), we use a market model to obtain CAR. The CAR is the difference between the 
return observed in the market and the return expected from the value-weighted market model. We estimate parameters 
of the market model over a 225-day range starting 31 calendar days before the event. MacKinlay (1997) provides details 
of this the event study method. Our results are robust if we use the equally weighted index. 
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We also know that investments involved in strategic alliances are significantly smaller and staggered. 
So, if investment irreversibility is the only factor at play, then one would expect an increase in policy 
uncertainty to have a relatively weaker impact on alliance formations vis-à-vis the previously 
documented effect on acquisitions. If, however, both investment irreversibility and relational risk are 
at play, then the net effect of policy uncertainty increase on strategic alliances may be equally strong 
or stronger vis-à-vis acquisitions, depending on the relative impacts of the two effects on these two 
very different types of corporate capital investment deals.   
Our analysis shows that the economic impact is somewhat stronger on strategic alliance 
formations. Recall from our discussion in Section 4.1.2, and Figure 3, that when Policy Uncertainty 
increases from 80 to 110, the probability of undertaking a strategic alliance drops by about 25%, from 
5.22% to 3.92%. In contrast, an increase in Policy Uncertainty from 80 to 110 is associated with a 
reduction in the probability of acquisition from 3.64% to 2.88%—a drop of about 21%, 4% smaller 
than its effect on strategic alliances.  In column 1 of Table 11 we report the logit regression on which 
this result is based. The dependent variable in this regression is the Acquisition Dummy, which assumes 
a value of one when the firm acquires at least one target and zero otherwise.16  For brevity, we do not 
report the figure as we do for the effect of policy uncertainty on strategic alliance formations. A 
comparison of the coefficient of Policy Uncertainty in column 1 of Panel A of Table 3 and column 1 of 
Panel A of Table 8 shows that they are statistically different with a p-value of 0.033. This p-value is 
based on a two-tailed t-test that compares the coefficient and standard error of Policy Uncertainty in 
Column 1 of Table 3 and Column 1 of Table 8. We reach the same conclusion when we compare the 
coefficient of OLS regression analysis (Column 1 of Panel A of Table 4, and Column 2 of Table 11), 
                                                          
16 The mean of Acquisition Dummy is 0.07059 and the median is 0. The standard deviation is 0.18937. The filters we use to 
obtain the acquisition data are similar to Moeller et al. (2004). We require that (i) acquirer controls less than 50% of the 
shares of the target at the announcement date and obtains 100% of the target shares, (ii) the deal value exceeds or equals 
$1 million, (iii) the transaction size is more than 1% of the value of the acquirer, and (iv) completion time is less than one 
thousand days. 
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instead of logit coefficients. A 30-point increase in policy uncertainty is associated with a 7% decrease 
in the standard deviation of the Alliance Dummy ((30*-0.0005)/0.224), and with 5% decrease in the 
standard deviation of Acquisition Dummy ((30*-0.0003)/ 0.18937). The p-value of a two-tailed t-test for 
equality of coefficient is 0.004. 
<Insert Table 11> 
5. Conclusions 
We contribute to the literature on corporate capital investments under policy uncertainty. Our 
study suggests that relational risk is another factor, besides investment irreversibility, why firms reduce 
investments during times of increased policy uncertainty. Often investments, particularly strategic 
alliances, involve contracts. These contracts are typically incomplete and imperfect (Tirole 1999). Our 
analysis suggests that with increase in policy uncertainty, the costs of writing and implementing these 
contracts also increase as relation (counterparty) risk increases. Overall, policy uncertainty deters 
investments that involve relational contract with another party, such as for strategic alliances. This is 
an important contribution because an emerging strand of literature examines the effect of policy 
uncertainty on investments, and the key argument, in all of these studies, has been that the investment 
irreversibility feature makes it more attractive to delay investments during times of high uncertainty.  
Our study shows that relation (counterparty) risk plays a dominant role in determining the 
effect on strategic alliances during times of elevated policy uncertainty. As strategic alliances have 
increased in prominence in recent years, the difference between the effects of policy uncertainty on 
M&A and strategic alliances take on an increased significance in the literature. While our study 
highlights the dominance of 'relation risk' for strategic alliances, previous studies on the effect of policy 
uncertainty on M&As conclude that investment 'irreversibility’ is the primary factor playing a role in 
the decline in such deals during elevated policy uncertainty regimes.  
35 
 
We also find that alliances that involve greater relational risk, such as those with multiple 
partners, partners with characteristics where the counterparty misbehavior is more likely, and 
industries that require intense contracts, decrease to a greater extent when policy uncertainty increases. 
Further, the economic impact of policy uncertainty on the likelihood of undertaking a corporate 
alliance is much stronger than its effect on the likelihood of an acquisition. Lastly, we find that the 
stock market reaction to strategic alliance announcements is significantly greater when they are 
undertaken during enhanced policy uncertainty regimes.  
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Appendix A 
An example of a strategic alliance 
Seattle Genetics and Millennium: The Takeda Oncology Company formed an agreement to globally develop 
and commercialize brentuximab vedotin, an antibody-drug conjugate that is in the late-stage clinical trials. 
Seattle Genetics is a clinical stage biotechnology company and does not have experience marketing a drug 
worldwide. Takeda is the largest pharmaceutical company in Japan and one of the global leaders of the industry. 
Seattle Genetics benefits from the marketing experience of Takeda. Moreover, Takeda benefits by getting an 
opportunity to market a drug that it did not have the expertise to develop but can market globally. The following 
quote is illustrative of the mutual benefit, “Under the collaboration, Seattle Genetics will receive an upfront 
payment of $60 million and retains full commercialization rights for brentuximab vedotin in the United States 
and Canada. The Takeda Group will have exclusive rights to commercialize the product candidate in all 
countries other than the United States and Canada. Seattle Genetics is entitled to receive progress- and sales-
dependent milestone payments in addition to tiered double-digit royalties based on net sales of brentuximab 
vedotin within the Takeda Group's licensed territories. Milestone payments to Seattle Genetics could total more 
than $230 million. Seattle Genetics and the Takeda Group will jointly fund worldwide development costs on a 
50:50 basis. Development funding by the Takeda Group over the first three years of the collaboration is 
expected to be at least $75 million. In Japan, the Takeda Group will be solely responsible for development 
costs.”  
Source: http://investor.seattlegenetics.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=124860&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1365794 
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Appendix B 
Variables Descriptions 
Dependent 
variables 
 
Alliance Dummy An indicator variable that is 1 if the firm undertakes an alliance in that year, and 0 
otherwise. Source: SDC Platinum 
No. of Alliances The number of strategic alliances announced by the firm in the year.  
Source: SDC Platinum 
Acquisition Dummy An indicator variable that is 1 if the firm undertakes an acquisition in that year, and 0 
otherwise. Source: SDC Platinum 
CAR (-2,+2) The five-day cumulative abnormal return around the announcement of a strategic 
alliance. Source: SDC Platinum & Eventus 
Withdrawn An indicator variable that is equal to one when an alliance that was already announced 
is withdrawn. Source: SDC Platinum 
# of Alliances in a 
state with election -  
# of alliances in a 
state without election 
The difference in the number of alliances in a state with an election, and a bordering 
state without an election. Source: SDC Platinum 
# of Alliances in a 
state with election 
The total number of alliances in the state with an election. Source: SDC Platinum 
Research 
Variable 
 
Policy Uncertainty The level of policy uncertainty. A higher value indicates higher policy uncertainty.  
Source: http://www.policyuncertainty.com/us_monthly.html 
Firm-level 
control variables 
 
Ln(assets) The logarithm of Total Assets. Source: Compustat 
Age 
 
Year - Birth Year. Birth year is the year of IPO or the first year Compustat reports 
data for the firm. Source: Compustat 
Market-to-Book 
 
The market capitalization of the firm's stock divided by the total assets of the firm. 
Source: Compustat 
Cash 
 
The cash and cash equivalents of the firm divided by the total assets. Source: 
Compustat 
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R&D 
 
The R&D expenditure divided by the total assets of the firm. If R&D expenditure is 
missing, the value is set to zero. Source: Compustat 
R&D dummy 
 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the R&D expenditure for that year is 
missing, and 0 otherwise. Source: Compustat 
Cashflow 
 
Earnings before income and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets. Source: Compustat 
Gross margin Sales minus cost of goods sold divided by sales. Source: Compustat 
Debt-to-assets The ratio of total liabilities and total assets. Source: Compustat 
Capital The ratio of net property plant and equipment and total assets. Source: Compustat 
Sales Growth 
 
The log of the ratio of current year sales to previous year’s sales assets. Source: 
Compustat 
Macro-
economic 
controls 
 
Sales growth 
dispersion 
 
The cross-sectional standard deviation of the sales growth of all firms for that year. 
Source: Compustat 
Real earnings 
volatility 
 
The 12-month rolling standard deviation of real earnings. Source: 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm 
Leading indicators 
 
An index that measures the leading indicators to predict the future of the business 
cycle. Source: https://www.conference-
board.org/data/bci/chartdatagrid.cfm?cid=1&dataseries=G0M920&series=US_Series 
Real earnings index 
 
The index of the real earnings of the publicly traded firms in the U.S. Source: 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm 
Current economic 
conditions 
 
The economic index that measures the current economic conditions by means of 
surveys: Source: http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/charts.html 
CAPE Shiller 
index 
 
The Shiller's CAPE Index: Source: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm 
BAA-Fed fund rate 
 
The difference in the yields of the Moody's seasoned corporate BAA rated bonds and 
the Fed Fund rate. Source: https://fred.stlouisfed.org 
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Time trend The numerical values of the year. 
Other variables   
Asset Redeployable An indicator variable that is equal to 1 when the partner in the strategic alliance has 
assets redeployability score higher than the median.  The scores are based on Kim and 
Kung (2016). 
Contract Intensive 
Industry 
An indicator variable that is equal to 1 when the partner in the strategic alliance is 
from an industry that is among the twenty most contract intense industries. Sources: 
Nunn (2007) 
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Appendix C 
Panel A: Sample selection  
 Observations 
Total Compustat firm-years          336,243  
Less firms not headquartered in the U.S          (42,317) 
Less firm-years with no Total Assets and Sales data          (46,385) 
Less firms that belong to Finance and Utility Industries          (56,303) 
Less firm-years with missing Market-to-Book            (9,490) 
Less firm-years without the Sales growth            (8,417) 
Less firm-years with no PPE            (2,625) 
Less firm-year with missing other control variables               (589) 
          170,117  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
Panel B: Number of observations in our sample by industry 
  Industries Observations Alliances 
1 Agriculture 708  41  
2 Food Products 3,155  123  
3 Candy & Soda 593  46  
4 Beer & Liquor 701  45  
5 Tobacco Products 241  3  
6 Recreation 1,585  146  
7 Entertainment 3,347  207  
8 Printing and Publishing 1,443  93  
9 Consumer Goods 3,276  176  
10 Apparel 2,472  159  
11 Healthcare 3,848  166  
12 Medical Equipment 6,386  592  
13 Pharmaceutical Products 10,058  1,764  
14 Chemicals 3,826  205  
15 Rubber and Plastic Products 1,753  54  
16 Textiles 936  31  
17 Construction Materials 3,610  65  
18 Construction 2,263  49  
19 Steel Works Etc. 2,626  38  
20 Fabricated Products 655  14  
21 Machinery 6,013  291  
22 Electrical Equipment 2,993  151  
23 Automobiles and Trucks 2,893  148  
24 Aircraft 843  66  
25 Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 370  12  
26 Defense 306  13  
27 Precious Metals 941  12  
28 Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 697  11  
29 Coal 384  3  
30 Petroleum and Natural Gas 8,460  210  
31 Utilities - - 
32 Communication 8,208  555  
33 Personal Services 2,332  66  
34 Business Services 25,085  3,287  
35 Computers 7,772  1,347  
36 Electronic Equipment 11,338  1,166  
37 Measuring and Control Equipment 3,914  330  
38 Business Supplies 2,255  70  
39 Shipping Containers 573  13  
40 Transportation 5,572  206  
41 Wholesale 7,257  420  
42 Retail 9,811  440  
43 Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 3,949  104  
44 Banking - - 
45 Insurance - - 
46 Real Estate - - 
47 Trading - - 
48 Not available 4,669  49  
 Total 170,117  12,987  
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Panel C: Number of observations, alliances and firms undertaking alliances in our sample by year 
Year Observations Alliances Firms Undertaking Alliances 
1990                            5,479                   292                                            152  
1991                            5,484                   438                                            251  
1992                            5,617                   959                                            251  
1993                            5,949                   758                                            445  
1994                            6,253                   841                                            494  
1995                            6,558                   847                                            532  
1996                            7,313                   664                                            448  
1997                            7,564                   952                                            610  
1998                            7,445                   883                                            588  
1999                            7,609                   979                                            630  
2000                            7,585                   583                                            416  
2001                            7,274                   309                                            237  
2002                            6,708                   269                                            214  
2003                            6,274                   362                                            296  
2004                            5,989                   282                                            245  
2005                            5,729                   309                                            264  
2006                            5,551                   490                                            352  
2007                            5,370                   440                                            344  
2008                            5,077                   365                                            293  
2009                            4,926                     39                                              40  
2010                            4,784                     40                                              42  
2011                            4,645                     88                                              82  
2012                            4,512                   128                                            114  
2013                            4,605                   137                                            123  
2014                            4,627                   161                                            149  
2015                            4,538                     13                                              12  
2016                            4,176                   168                                            144  
2017                            4,293                   351                                            301  
2018                            4,212                   402                                            345  
2019                            3,971                   438                                            376  
Total                        170,117               12,987                                         8,790  
 
 
 
 
  
45 
 
 
Panel D: The frequency of the number of alliances a firm undertook in a year, if they did form at least one 
alliance 
The frequency of # of alliances in a year % of the sample 
1 74.38% 
2 15.89% 
3 5.63% 
4 0.21% 
5 0.10% 
6 or greater 3.79% 
Total 100.00% 
 
 
 
Panel E: The breakdown of alliances based on the number of partners 
# of partners in Alliance 
% of the 
sample 
1 partner 92.71% 
2 partners 5.15% 
3 partners 0.81% 
4 partners 0.58% 
5 partners 0.33% 
6 or more partners 0.42% 
Total 100.00% 
 
 
 
Panel F: The number of alliances by alliance type 
Alliance Type % of Alliances Number 
License_alliance 19.67%                             2,554  
R&D_alliance 17.06%                             2,216  
Funding_alliance 1.75%                               227  
Manufacturing_alliance 9.42%                             1,224  
Marketing_alliance 22.49%                             2,922  
Supply_alliance 4.28%                               555  
Not Specified 25.33%                             3,289  
Total 100.00%                           12,987  
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Table 1: Summary statistics of the sample used in baseline logit regression 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Nos. of Alliances 0.076 0.506 0.000 36.000 
Alliance Dummy 0.052 0.224 0.000 1.000 
Policy Uncertainty 103.448 25.257 69.475 164.317 
Ln(assets) 4.955 2.644 -2.577 11.696 
Age 7.181 5.992 0.000 67.000 
Market-to-Book 2.019 5.048 0.019 59.886 
Cash 0.191 0.227 0.000 0.969 
R&D 0.068 0.153 0.000 1.096 
R&D dummy 0.414 0.493 0.000 1.000 
EBIT -0.135 0.813 -7.403 0.391 
Gross margin -0.054 3.105 -21.825 0.966 
Debt 0.540 0.273 0.027 1.000 
PPE 0.272 0.242 0.000 0.920 
Sales growth -0.005 3.296 -18.154 18.159 
Sales growth dispersion 0.950 0.181 0.524 1.189 
Real earnings volatility 0.024 0.060 0.000 0.358 
Leading business cycle indicators 114.399 35.215 70.463 252.102 
Real earnings index 69.566 27.581 30.549 134.389 
Current economic conditions 99.140 12.158 68.100 114.200 
CAPE Shiller index 25.555 6.430 14.818 40.553 
BAA-Fed fund rate 3.864 1.783 0.980 8.270 
Time trend 2003.520 8.365 1990.000 2019.000 
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Table 2: Correlations of the sample used in baseline regression 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
           
[1] Nos. of Alliances 1.00         
[2] Alliance Dummy 0.66 1.00        
[3] Policy Uncertainty -0.05 -0.07 1.00       
[4] Ln(assets) 0.08 0.07 0.11 1.00      
[5] Age -0.03 -0.01 0.18 0.21 1.00     
[6] Market-to-Book 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.28 -0.01 1.00    
[7] Cash 0.08 0.11 0.02 -0.22 -0.04 0.18 1.00   
[8] R&D 0.06 0.08 0.00 -0.3 -0.03 0.23 0.38 1.00  
[9] R&D dummy -0.08 -0.11 -0.01 0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.26 -0.35 1.00 
[10] EBIT 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.43 0.03 -0.55 -0.13 -0.43 0.05 
[11] Gross margin 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.02 -0.18 -0.26 -0.32 0.06 
[12] Debt -0.04 -0.06 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.38 0.02 0.13 
[13] PPE -0.06 -0.08 -0.02 0.19 -0.03 -0.1 -0.39 -0.2 0.28 
[14] Sales growth 0.08 0.08 -0.48 -0.13 0.09 -0.19 -0.13 -0.14 -0.03 
[15] Sales growth dispersion 0.03 0.04 0.43 0.13 0.16 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.02 
[16] Real earnings volatility -0.04 -0.05 0.41 0.04 0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 
[17] Leading business cycle indicators -0.04 -0.02 -0.17 0.1 0.16 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.01 
[18] Real earnings index -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.21 0.26 0.07 0.1 0.04 -0.04 
[19] Current economic conditions 0.05 0.08 -0.72 -0.05 -0.11 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
[20] CAPE Shiller index 0.03 0.05 -0.37 0.03 -0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.02 
[21] BAA-Fed fund rate -0.03 -0.04 0.54 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.01 
[22] Time trend -0.04 -0.03 0.37 0.26 0.34 0.07 0.11 0.05 -0.05 
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    [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] 
[10] EBIT 1.00             
[11] Gross margin 0.31 1.00            
[12] Debt -0.22 0.02 1.00           
[13] PPE 0.07 0.06 0.14 1.00          
[14] Sales growth 0.29 0.21 0.01 0.04 1.00         
[15] Sales growth dispersion 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.01 1.00        
[16] Real earnings volatility -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 1.00       
[17] Leading business cycle indicators -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.1 0.00 0.31 -0.18 1.00      
[18] Real earnings index -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 -0.01 0.5 -0.25 0.48 1.00     
[19] Current economic conditions 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.27 -0.52 -0.1 0.24 1.00    
[20] CAPE Shiller index -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.2 -0.24 -0.13 0.34 0.72 1.00   
[21] BAA-Fed fund rate -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.15 0.37 0.18 -0.3 -0.74 -0.48 1.00  
[22] Time trend -0.07 -0.04 0.01 -0.1 0.01 0.45 0.15 0.45 0.79 -0.17 0.14 0.24 1.00 
Notes on Table 2:  Panel A reports the summary statistics of the sample used in the baseline regression. Panel B presents the Pearson correlations. 
Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A. The bolded correlations are significant at 5 percent.  
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Table 3: Policy uncertainty reduces the likelihood that a firm will undertake a strategic alliance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
 Dependent Variable = Alliance Dummy 
     
Policy Uncertainty -0.0102 -0.0148 -0.0124 -0.0101 
 (-12.1137)*** (-14.2131) *** (-14.1993) *** (-5.1096)*** 
Ln(assets) 0.2917 0.2353  0.2031 
 (27.4043) *** (10.3696) ***  (0.0085) 
Age -0.0071 -0.0175  -0.0220 
 (-2.9569) *** (-3.2946) ***  (-0.0035) 
Market-to-Book 0.0193 0.0178  0.0130 
 (8.1741) *** (6.6995) ***  (0.0116) 
Cash 0.7842 0.6199  0.1509 
 (7.8116) *** (5.7444) ***  (0.0148) 
R&D 1.2351 1.1911  0.2544 
 (9.7734) *** (10.4490) ***  (0.0057) 
R&D dummy -0.5499 -0.5478  -0.1699 
 (-10.8023) *** (-10.7221) ***  (-0.1204) 
EBIT -0.0442 -0.0123  -0.0176 
 (-1.3923) (-0.3130)  (-0.0006) 
Gross margin 0.0230 0.0197  0.0017 
 (5.3492) *** (4.5491) ***  (0.0033) 
Debt -0.3279 -0.3696  -0.2015 
 (-3.667) *** (-3.509) ***  (-0.005) 
PPE -0.7154 -0.3265  -0.0411 
 (-6.4361) *** (-1.9577) *  (-0.0003) 
Sales growth 0.0129 0.0285  0.0006 
 (2.6584) *** (3.5780) ***  (0.0001) 
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Sales growth dispersion 0.0000   0.0000 
 (2.1575) **   (0.0504) 
Real earnings volatility -6.3197   -7.0413 
 (-2.481) **   (-0.004) 
Leading_indicators 0.0033   0.0041 
 (1.3323)   (0.0058) 
Real_earnings -0.0185   0.0029 
 (-1.5513)   (0.0009) 
Current_economic_conditions 0.0082   -0.0208 
 (0.4302)   (-0.0017) 
CAPE Shiller index 0.0020   0.0065 
 (0.1082)   (0.0016) 
BAA-Fed fund rate -0.0402   -0.0039 
 (-0.4288)   (-0.0022) 
Time trend -0.0101   -0.0581 
 (-0.2667)   (-0.0009) 
Firm Fixed Effects No No No Yes 
Inds. fixed effect Yes Yes Yes No 
Wald Chi2 4,104.6865 3,734.2515 890.5402 1,237.9218 
Pseudo R2 0.1342 0.1013 0.0626 0.1366 
N 170,117 170,117 170,117 59,617 
Groups       4,015 
Notes on Table 3: This table reports the logit coefficients. Alliance Dummy is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm undertakes a 
strategic alliance and 0 otherwise. Policy Uncertainty measures the extent of policy uncertainty. The industry fixed effects are based on Fama and French’s 
48 industry grouping. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A. In parentheses are the t-statistics based on standard errors based on double cluster 
by firm and year for all coefficients except those reported in column 4 where the t-statics are based on clustering by year. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 4: Robustness of baseline results 
Panel A: The main results are robust when using OLS, or when using the number of alliances undertaken as a dependent variable  
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
 DV= Alliance Dummy DV= Number of Alliances DV= Number of Alliances 
    
 OLS OLS Negative Binomial 
    
Policy Uncertainty -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0091 
 (-5.1942)*** (-7.5361)*** (- 8.8158)*** 
 
   
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Macro economic controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time trend Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
   
 
   
Wald Chi2  
 3,9081.4213 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0616 0.0525  
N 170,117 170,117 170,117 
Groups     18,165 
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Panel B: Main results are robust when we analyze different subsamples based on the type of alliance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
      
Dependent Variable = Alliance Dummy 
 Subsample= Subsample = Subsample = Subsample = Subsample = Subsample = 
 
Supply alliance License alliance 
Manufacturing 
alliance Marketing alliance R&D alliance Funding alliance 
 
      
Policy Uncertainty -0.0140 -0.0200 -0.0150 -0.0183 -0.0221 -0.0507 
 (-5.0389)*** (-3.8165) *** (-1.9657) ** (-3.6207) *** (-4.7418) *** (-3.1022)*** 
       
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Wald Chi2 1,056.5627 2,472.0139 1,035.0069 1,964.7006 2,409.8943 1,6425.8355 
Pseudo.- R Sqd 0.1599 0.1372 0.1490 0.1588 0.1948 0.1579 
N 170,117  170,117  170,117  170,117  170,117  170,117  
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Panel C: Robustness test using individual components of policy uncertainty index 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable = Alliance Dummy 
News component -0.0053    
 (-7.7942) ***    
Government Spend. component  -0.0005   
  (-3.1441) ***   
CPI component   -0.0074  
   (-8.7813) ***  
Tax component    -0.0002 
    (-2.5586) ** 
     
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro economic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Wald Chi2 4,105.2211 3,657.2910 4,037.1039 3,801.2180 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1312 0.1367 0.1317 0.1218 
N 170,117 170,117 170,117 170,117 
Notes on Table 4: The results of Panel A indicate that the main results continue to hold when we use OLS instead of logit, and when we use No. of 
Alliances, the number of strategic alliances in a firm-year, as the dependent variable. Panel B reports the results of subsamples of different types of the 
alliance. Panel C reports the results when we use the individual components of policy uncertainty that is used to construct the overall policy uncertainty 
index. Alliance Dummy is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm undertakes a strategic alliance and 0 otherwise.  Firm-level controls, 
Macro-economic controls, and Time trend represent the control variables that we use in our main model (i.e., Table 3, Column 1). In parentheses are the 
t-statistics based on standard errors based on double clustering by firm and year for all coefficients except those reported in and Panel A’s column 3 where 
the t-statics are based on clustering by year. 
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Table 5 Difference-in-differences test 
Panel A: Baseline test 
  (1) (2) 
   
 Dependent variable = # of Alliances in a state with election - # of alliances in 
a state without election 
   
Election Year -0.0054 -0.0558 
 (-1.9304)* (-4.0012)*** 
Δ Lag Alliances  0.0023 
  (7.013)*** 
Δ Lag GDP/Capita Growth  -0.0000 
  (-1.472) 
Δ Lag Unemployment Rate  -0.0047 
 
 (-4.143)*** 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Adj R-squared 0.1384  0.2561 
N 618 618 
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Panel B: Difference-in-differences results for high versus low uncertainty elections 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample  
 Dependent variable = # of Alliances in a state with election-  # of alliances in a state without election 
    
 Governor Change Incumbent Governor Close Election 
 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
 
      
Election Year  -0.0696 -0.0061 -0.0567 -0.0166 -0 .04635 -0.0186 
 (-3.1615)*** (-0.2422) (2.9403)*** (-0.6858) (-2.0312)** (-0.2114) 
Δ Lag Alliances 0.0016 0.0021 0.0011 0.0015 0.0015 0.0011 
 (3.2532)*** (4.8517)*** ( 2.0750)** (3.8516)*** (5.0117)*** (5.0730)*** 
Δ Lag GDP/Capita Growth -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (-0.1456) (-1.072) (-1.9875)** (-2.1721)** (-2.3203)** (0.8729) 
Δ Lag Unemployment Rate -0.0039 -0.0062 -0.0047 -0.0072 -0.0016 -0.0012 
 (-1.4925) (-3.6221)*** (-1.8919)* ( -4.3629)*** (-2.0781)** (-1.8318)* 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R-squared 0.3578 0.3169 0.3436 0.3026 0.3328 0.3257 
N 209 409 204 414 309 309 
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Panel C: Corporate alliances before and after an election 
  (1) 
  
 Dependent variable = # of Alliances in a state with election 
 
 
Election Year (T= +1) 0.0042 
 (2.5922)** 
Post-Election Year (T= +2) 0.0021 
 (2.0321)** 
Pre-Election Year (T= -1) -0.0004 
 ( -0.8924) 
Lag Alliances 0.0005 
 (2.5806)** 
Lag GDP/Capita Growth -0.0002 
 ( -0.5618) 
Lag Unemployment Rate -0.0012 
 (-1.5434) 
Lag S&P 500 Returns 0.0002 
 (2.2015)** 
Lag Interest Rate 0.0021 
 (2.2427)** 
State fixed effects Yes 
Adj R-squared 0.6218 
N 618 
Notes on Table 5: Panel A of this table reports the difference-in-difference test. The dependent variable is the difference in the number of alliances in a 
state with an election, and a bordering state without an election. Δ Lag Alliances is the difference in the number of alliances last year. Δ Lag GDP/capita 
Growth is the difference in the GDP growth, Δ Lag Unemployment Rate is the lag of the difference in the unemployment rate between the two states. Panel 
B reports the test of Column 2 in Panel A, but by separating the sample into by whether the elections involved high uncertainty or low uncertainty. The 
measures for the uncertainty of the election is whether there was a change in governor, whether the incumbent governor was running for election, and 
whether the election was close.  High uncertainty elections are ones where the governor changes or the incumbent governor was not running, or the 
victory margin was less than the median. Panel C reports the results when the dependent variable is # of Alliances in a state with election, the total number in 
the state with an election. In parentheses are the t-statistics computed using standard errors based on double clustering by state and year. *, ** and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Does increased policy uncertainty affect alliance formations because of relational risk? 
Panel A: During politically uncertain times firms prefer an alliance with fewer partners 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
 Dependent variable = More than two partners in alliance 
    
Policy Uncertainty -0.0019 -0.0069 -0.0038 
 (-1.9827)** (-4.4705)*** (-2.6216)*** 
 
   
Firm-level controls Yes Yes No 
Macro-controls Yes No No 
Time trend Yes No No 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
   
Wald Chi2 379.9759 176.1935 6.8718 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0515 0.0293 0.0105 
N  8,387   8,387   8,387  
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Panel B: High policy uncertainty is associated with fewer strategic alliances undertaken when the partner is research intensive 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Subsample= Subsample=  
 Partner with R&D expenditure Partner without R&D expenditure All Firms 
 
  
 
Policy Uncertainty -0.0154 -0.0079 -0.0084 
 (-12.4746)*** (-9.4103)*** (-9.1708)*** 
Policy Uncertainty*High Partner R&D   -0.0081 
  
 (3.8322)*** 
High Partner R&D  
 0.0097 
 
  (5.5537)*** 
 
   
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Macro economic controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
    
 P-value of test for equality of the 
coefficients of Policy Uncertainty 0.0014 
  
    
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
Wald Chi2 3,803.9519 3,426.7055 4,907.9793 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1411 0.0907 0.2142 
N 166,601 164,843 170,117 
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Panel C:  High policy uncertainty is associated with fewer strategic alliances undertaken in services industries  
  (1) (2) (3) 
 DV= Alliance Dummy 
    
 Subsample = Subsample =  All Firms 
 Services All Industries except Services  
Policy Uncertainty -0.0150 -0.0085 -0.0101 
 (-7.6967)*** (-3.2561)*** (-13.0022)*** 
Policy Uncertainty*Services   -0.0134 
 
  (-3.1153)*** 
Services   0.0084 
 
  (8.8136)*** 
 
   
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Macro economic controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
    
 P-value of test for equality of 
the coeff. of Policy Uncertainty 0.0001 
  
    
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
Wald Chi2 4,023.1186 3,714.0563 5,018.1032 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1328 0.1026 0.1933 
N 153,574 157,772 160,059 
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Panel D: High policy uncertainty is associated with fewer strategic alliances undertaken in contract intensive industries 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Dependent Variable = Alliance Dummy 
 Subsample = Subsample =  Subsample =  
 Most Contract Intensive 
Industries 
Least Contract Intensive 
Industries 
Most + Least Contract Intensive 
Industries 
    
Policy Uncertainty -0.0122 -0.0038 -0.0115 
 (-3.5892)*** (-0.8336) (-4.3771)*** 
Policy Uncertainty*Contract Intensive 
Industry 
  -1.0005 
  
 (-3.0776)*** 
Contract Intensive Industry  
 0.6179 
 
  (1.5972) 
 
   
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Macro economic controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
    
 P-value of test for equality of the 
coeff. of Policy Uncertainty 0.0308 
  
    
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
Wald Chi2 3,847.7612 3748.4846 4,034.8214 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1126 0.1071 0.1108 
N 162,005  158,108 170,117 
61 
 
Notes on Table 6: This table consists of four panels. This table reports the logit coefficients. Alliance Dummy is an indicator variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the firm undertakes a strategic alliance and 0 otherwise. Policy Uncertainty measures the extent of policy uncertainty.  Firm-level controls, Macro-
economic controls, and Time trend represent the control variables that we use in our main model (i.e., Table 3, Column 1). In parentheses are the p-values 
based on standard errors based on double clustering—by firm and year.  Panel A shows that a firm is less likely to undertake a strategic alliance with 
multiple partners during politically uncertain times. More than two partner in alliance takes the value of 1 if the firm undertakes an alliance with multiple 
partners, rather than only one partner. The sample includes firms that formed an alliance.  Panel B shows that the negative effect of Policy Uncertainty on 
the undertaking of strategic alliances is much stronger when the partner is research-intensive, compared to the rest. High Partner R&D is equal to 1 when 
the partner in the alliance reports R&D expenditure and 0 otherwise. Panel C shows that the negative effect of Policy Uncertainty on the undertaking of 
strategic alliances is much stronger for firms that belong to service industries, compared to the rest. In service industries, the likelihood of managerial 
opportunism is higher. Services is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 when the partner belongs to the household or business services (Fama French 
industry codes 33 and 34). Panel D shows that the negative effect of Policy Uncertainty on the undertaking of strategic alliances is much stronger when the 
partner belongs to an industry that requires more intense contracting. In parentheses are the t-statistics computed using standard errors based on double 
clustering by firm and year. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 7: Does policy uncertainty affect alliance formation because it is optimal to delay irreversible investments? 
Panel A: The effect of policy uncertainty on strategic alliances is not stronger when alliances are more irreversible 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 DV= Alliance Dummy 
 Subsample = Subsample = All Firms 
 License+Marketing Manufacturing+Supply+Funding  
   
 
Policy Uncertainty -0.0103 -0.0209 -0.0077 
 (-8.8702)*** (-9.2501)*** (-9.5586)*** 
Policy Uncertainty*License+Marketing   0.0096 
   (1.0289) 
License+Marketing   -3.7349 
   (-1.9337)* 
    
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Macro economic controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
    
 P-value of test for equality of the 
coefficients of Policy Uncertainty 
0.7106   
    
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Chi2 2,369.6088 2,534.6412 3,438.3607 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1531 0.1608 0.1672 
N  162,499   160,354   170,117  
 
 
  
63 
 
Panel B: Irreversibility of investment does not moderate the effect of policy uncertainty on strategic alliances 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 DV= Alliance Dummy 
    
 Subsample = Subsample =   
 High Asset Redeployability  Low Asset Redeployability All firms 
    
Policy Uncertainty -0.0118 -0.0094 -0.0088 
 (-9.4827)*** (-7.4574)*** (-7.2315)*** 
Policy Uncertainty*Asset Redeployable   -0.0018 
 
  (-0.5769) 
Asset Redeployable   0.6578 
 
  (4.3857)*** 
 
   
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Macro economic controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
    
 P-value of test for equality of 
the coefficients of Policy 
Uncertainty 
0.3573   
    
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Chi2 520.4931 283.6180 894.2273 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0927 0.0703 0.0912 
N 83,414 86,703 170,117 
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Notes on Table 7: This table reports the logit coefficients. Alliance Dummy is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm undertakes a 
strategic alliance and 0 otherwise. Policy Uncertainty measures the extent of policy uncertainty.  Firm-level controls, Macro-economic controls and Time 
trend represent the control variables that we use in our main model (i.e., Table 3, Column 1). In parentheses are the p-values based on standard errors 
based on double clustering—by firm and year. Panel A shows the effect of Policy Uncertainty on the formation of strategic alliances for two different 
subsamples. A subsample of alliance type that has less sunk costs (License & Marketing), and one with greater sunk cost (Manufacturing, Supply & 
Funding). In Panel B, column 1 reports the results of the subsample of firm-years where the partner belongs to industries whose assets redeployability 
score is above the median. Column 2 reports the results of the subsample of firm-years where the partner belongs to industries whose assets redeployability 
score is below the median. Column 3 reports the results of a pooled analysis. In parentheses are the t-statistics computed using standard errors based on 
double clustering, by firm and year. 
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Table 8: Policy uncertainty’s effect on undertaking acquisitions 
Panel A: Is the effect of increased policy uncertainty on acquisitions much stronger when the target belongs to an industry involving high contract 
intensity? 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable = Acquisition Dummy 
    
 Subsample = 
Most Contract Intensive Industries 
Subsample =  
Least Contract Intensive Industries 
Subsample =  
Most + Least Contract Intensive Industries 
 
  
 
Policy Uncertainty -0.012 -0.0105 -0.0078 
 (-3.0584)*** (-2.8242)*** (-3.3681)*** 
Policy Uncertainty*  -0.0032 
Contract Intensive Industry (-1.4582) 
  
  
Contract Intensive Industry  
 0.4416 
 
  (1.8583)* 
 
   
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-economic 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
    
 P-value of test for 
equality of the 
coefficients of Policy 
Uncertainty 
0.5294   
    
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Chi2 1920.0537 1862.9732 2,200.8463 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0817 0.0545 0.0508 
N 162,005 158,108 170,117 
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Panel B: Is the effect of policy uncertainty on acquisitions much stronger when the target belongs to an industry involving high asset redeployability? 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Dependent variable= Acquisition Dummy 
    
 Subsample = Subsample =  Subsample =  
 Asset Redeployable =1 Asset Redeployable =0 Asset Redeployable =1, 0 
Policy Uncertainty -0.0079 -0.0117 -0.0121 
 (-5.6326)*** (-7.8423)*** (-7.6870)*** 
Policy Uncertainty*Asset Redeployable   0.0036 
 
  (2.7467)*** 
Asset Redeployable   -0.2287 
 
  (-1.0321) 
 
   
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-economic controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
    
 P-value of test for equality of 
the coefficients of Policy 
Uncertainty 
0.0148   
    
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Chi2 157.7305 231.1136 360.864 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0612 0.0742 0.0586 
N 83,414 86,703 170,117 
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Panel C: The relative impact of relational risk and investment irreversibility on corporate alliances versus acquisitions 
  (1) (2) 
 DV = Acquisition Dummy DV = Alliance Dummy 
   
Policy Uncertainty -0.0119 -0.0131 
 (-3.0835)*** (-3.3793)*** 
Policy Uncertainty*Contract Intensive Industry -0.0006 -0.0037 
 (-0.0616) (3.2090)*** 
Contract Intensive Industry 0.2842 0.4679 
 (0.2707) (0.2541) 
Policy Uncertainty*Asset Redeployable 0.0028 -0.0047 
 (2.0721)** (-1.1774) 
Asset Redeployable -0.1685 0.8027 
 (-0.3641) (2.0312)** 
 
  
Firm-level controls Yes Yes 
Macro-economic controls Yes Yes 
Time trend Yes Yes 
   
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes 
Wald Chi2 2233.4917 4146.2445 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0603 0.1149 
N 170,117 170,117 
 
 
68 
 
Notes on Table 8: In column 1 of Panel A, the subsample includes only those acquisitions with partners in most contract intensive industries. In column 
2 the subsample includes only those acquisitions with partners in the least contract intensive industries. The information on the intensity of the contract 
is obtained from Nunn (2007). Column 3 reports the results of a pooled analysis. Contract Intensive Industry is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 when 
the partner belongs to an industry ranked among top-twenty contract and 0 otherwise. The information on contract intensity is obtained from Nunn 
(2007). Panel B reports the logit coefficients. It shows that Policy Uncertainty has a weaker effect on the likelihood of acquisition when the target belongs 
to an industry with high asset redeployability. In column 1 the subsample includes only those acquisitions where the target’s assets redeployability was 
more than the median, and in column 2 the subsample includes only those acquisitions where the target’s asset redeployability is below the median. In 
Panel C, we also report the logit results when Policy Uncertainty*Contract Intensive Industry and Policy Uncertainty*Asset Redeployable are included in the same 
regression.  Firm-level controls, Macro-economic controls and Time trend represent the control variables that we use in our main model (i.e., Table 3, 
Column 1). In parentheses are the t-statistics computed using standard errors based on double clustering, by firm and year. 
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Table 9: When policy uncertainty is high, firms are more likely to withdraw from an alliance  
Panel A: Univariate tests 
  High Policy Uncertainty Low Policy Uncertainty (1)-(2) t-stat p-value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Withdrawn 0.032 0.027 0.005 5.764 (0.000) 
 
Panel B: Multivariate tests 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
 Dependent Variable = Withdrawn 
    
Policy Uncertainty 0.0008 0.0020 0.0048 
 (0.2168) (2.1825)** (5.2959)*** 
 
   
 
   
Firm-level controls Yes Yes No 
Macro-controls Yes No No 
Time trend Yes No No 
Industry Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
Wald Chi2 1,188.67 330.95 28.05 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2134 0.1239 0.0704 
N 12,531 12,531 12,531 
Notes on Table 9:  The variable Withdrawn takes the value of 1 if an alliance that was announced is broken off. Panel A presents the univariate analysis. 
High Policy Uncertainty represents the period when policy uncertainty was greater than the median. Low Policy Uncertainty represents the period when 
policy uncertainty is lower than the median. Panel B presents the multivariate results. Firm-level controls, Macro-economic controls and Time trend 
represent the control variable that we use in our main model (i.e., Table 3, Column 1). In parentheses are the t-statistics computed using standard errors 
based on double clustering, by firm and year. 
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Table 10: Stock market reaction to announcement of strategic alliances is higher when policy uncertainty is high 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis 
            
 High Policy Uncertainty Low Policy Uncertainty (1)-(2) t-stat p-value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CAR[-1,1] 0.0113 0.0082 0.0031 2.0717 0.0192** 
CAR[-2,2] 0.0118 0.0089 0.0029 1.9741 0.0463 ** 
 
Panel B: Multivariate Analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DV= CAR(-1,+1) DV= CAR(-2,+2) DV= CAR(-1,+1) DV= CAR(-2,+2) 
   
 
 
Policy Uncertainty 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0005 
 (2.3721)** (2.6265)*** (2.5276)** (2.9794)*** 
   
  
CAR[-30,-3]   0.0454 0.0424 
   (3.5259)*** (3.1138)*** 
 
  
  
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro economic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
   
  
   
  
Adjusted R-squared 0.0171 0.0314 0.0425 0.0495 
N 12,987  12,987  12,987  12,987  
Notes on Table 10: This table shows that the cumulative abnormal returns of the strategic alliances that were undertaken during politically uncertain 
times are higher. CAR [-1, 1] and CAR [-2, 2] represents the cumulative abnormal returns for 3 day and 5 day windows. Panel A presents the univariate 
analysis. High Policy Uncertainty represents the period when policy uncertainty was greater than the median. Low Policy Uncertainty represents the period 
when policy uncertainty is lower than the median. Panel B presents the multivariate results. Firm-level controls, Macro-economic controls and Time trend 
represent the control variables that we use in our main model (i.e., Table 3, Column 1). In parentheses are the t-statistics based on standard errors based 
on double clustering—by firm and year.  
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Table 11: Acquisition and policy uncertainty  
  (1) (2) 
 DV= Acquisition Dummy DV= Acquisition Dummy 
 Logit OLS 
 
  
   
Policy Uncertainty -0.0078 -0.0003 
 (-5.9893)*** (-3.4114)*** 
  
 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes 
Macro-economic controls Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes 
   
  
 
  
 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes 
   
Wald Chi2 1964.1404  
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.0461 0.0123 
N 170,117 170,117 
Notes on Table 11: This reports the results of regression analysis when the dependent variable is Acquisition 
Dummy, and indicator variable that is equal to 1 when the firm acquires a target. Policy Uncertainty measures the 
extent of policy uncertainty. Column 1 reports logit coefficients, column 2 reports the OLS results. Firm-level 
controls, Macro-economic controls and Time trend represent the control variables that we use in our main 
model (i.e., Table 3, Column 1). In parentheses are the t-statistics based on standard errors based on double 
clustering—by firm and year.  
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Figure 1 
 
A graphical representation of policy uncertainty and the number of alliances during the sample 
period 
  
Notes on Figure 1: This figure plots the 12 months rolling sum of the total number of alliances and the 12 
months rolling average of policy uncertainty for every month from January 1990 onwards up to December 
2019.   
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Figure 2 
 
Policy uncertainty and strategic alliances undertaken 
 
Notes on Figure 2: This figure presents the mean of Alliance Dummy for a subsample that has policy uncertainty 
below the median and another subsample that has uncertainty above the median. Alliance Dummy is an indicator 
variable that is one if the firm undertakes an alliance in that year, and 0 otherwise. A two-tailed t-test shows 
that the difference is statistically significant with p-value < 0.001 percent. The t-statistics for t-test is 21.556.  
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Figure 3: The probability of undertaking an alliance with increasing policy uncertainty 
 
Notes on Figure 3: The figure plots the probability of undertaking an alliance based on the base line logit 
analysis specified in column 1 of Table 3.  
 
